# Foundations in economics


There are many aspects of the markets and networks which need to work. There are many types of markets. Financial, matching, curation, knowledge, social, etc.

Several particularly important and practical Nobel prizes in Economics

## Nobel - Ronald Coase
[Breakthrough in Understanding the Institutional Structure of the Economy](https://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-sciences/laureates/1991/press.html)

- The nature of the firm is ... due to transaction costs outside and inside of the form

- social cost and the courts

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Coase_theorem


## Nobel - Akerlof-Stiglitz-Pierce

[Markets with Asymmetric Information](https://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-sciences/laureates/2001/advanced-economicsciences2001.pdf) - very important insights

- incentives and asymmetric information

[INFORMATION AND THE CHANGE IN THE PARADIGM IN ECONOMICS](https://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-sciences/laureates/2001/stiglitz-lecture.pdf) by Stiglitz in 2011. How Information Economics came to be

## Nobel - Stapley-Roth

- reading and enjoying the book by Alvin Roth [Who Gets What ― and Why: The New Economics of Matchmaking and Market Design ](https://www.amazon.com/Who-Gets-What-Why-Matchmaking/dp/0544705289)

[Stable matching: Theory, evidence, and practical design](https://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-sciences/laureates/2012/popular-economicsciences2012.pdf)

[Deferred Acceptance Algorithms: History, Theory, Practice, and Open Questions By Alvin E. Roth in 2007](https://web.stanford.edu/~alroth/papers/GaleandShapley.revised.IJGT.pdf)

[The Theory and Practice of Market Design Prize Lecture, December 8, 2012 by Alvin E. Roth](https://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-sciences/laureates/2012/roth-lecture.pdf)


## Nobel - von Hayek and Myrdal

[The pretence of knowledge](https://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-sciences/laureates/1974/hayek-lecture.html) as a foundational overview in 1974 for the modern [knowledge market](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Knowledge_market) and [attention economy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Attention_economy)

**the very modern problem in the information age and very easy information propagation**

## Nobel - John Harsanyi, John Nash, and Reinhard Selten for game theory

"for their pioneering analysis of equilibria in the theory of non-cooperative games".
https://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-sciences/laureates/1994/

with a focus on non-cooperative solution concepts

## Nobel - Leonid Hurwicz, Eric S. Maskin and Roger B. Myerson 

for having laid the foundations of mechanism design theory".
https://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-sciences/laureates/2007/

- Asymmetric information and economic institutions

> Buyers and sellers sometimes haggle too hard and therefore fail to trade. Desirable joint projects are
> sometimes not undertaken because the projects’ beneficiaries fail to agree how the costs should be
> shared. Sickness insurance, for example, is typically criticized either for offering too little coverage or
> for inviting misuse. In either case, the basic problem is that people have an incentive to economize
> with their private information: some insurancy-policy sellers claim that their costs are high in order to
> increase the price; some beneficiaries of joint projects such as insurance-policy holders claim that their
> benefits are low in order to reduce their own contributions to the project; some well-insured workers
> claim that they are sick, in order to reduce their workload.

## Nobel - Jean Tirole 

for his analysis of market power and regulation

- PLATFORM COMPETITION IN TWO-SIDED MARKETS - ..........attached

> Many if not most markets with network externalities are two-sided. To succeed, platforms in
> industries such as software, portals and media, payment systems and the Internet, must “get
> both sides of the market on board.” Accordingly, platforms devote much attention to their
> business model, that is, to how they court each side while making money overall. This paper
> builds a model of platform competition with two-sided markets. It unveils the determinants
> of price allocation and end-user surplus for different governance structures (proŽ t-maximizing
> platforms and not-for-proŽ t joint undertakings), and compares the outcomes with those
> under an integrated monopolist and a Ramsey planner

## Nobel - Herbert Simon 

- The architecture of Complexity ...........attached

> The idea of near decomposability provides some guidelines for designing an
> organization and information systems for it. It can also add to our understanding
> of the existence of economic organizations in two ways. First, great increases in
> effectiveness are obtainable by introducing mechanisms of coordination between
> interrelated activities. 
> Second, in the Darwinian competition among systems for survival and growth, near
> decomposability provides a major advantage for the systems possessing it,

## Nobel - Richard H. Thaler 

"for his contributions to behavioural economics".

## Nobel -  Daniel Kahneman and Vernon L. Smith

- "for having integrated insights from psychological research into economic science, especially concerning human judgment and decision-making under uncertainty" 

- "for having established laboratory experiments as a tool in empirical economic analysis, especially in the study of alternative market mechanisms".

## Nobel - Robert J. Aumann and Thomas C. Schelling 

"for having enhanced our understanding of conflict and cooperation through game-theory analysis"
https://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-sciences/laureates/2005/

# Parents

* Finance andPractical Economics

# Attachments

* [](https://knowen-production.s3.amazonaws.com/uploads/attachment/file/1743/PLATFORM%2BCOMPETITION%2BIN%2Btwo-sided%2Bmarket%2B-%2B%2B%2B%2BRochetTirole3.pdf)
* [](https://knowen-production.s3.amazonaws.com/uploads/attachment/file/1771/The%2Barchitecture%2Bof%2Bcomplexity%2B-%2BHerbert%2BSimon.pdf)